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PRIOR AND RELATED APPEALS

The Utah State Engineer lmows ofno prior or related appeals in this
matter.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

UTAH ALUNITE CORP. and the UTAH SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL
TRUST LANDS ADMINISTRATION,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
KENT L. JONES, in his official capacity as the State Engineer, and CENTAL
IRON COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,
Defendants and Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE UTAH STATE ENGINEER

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Plaintiffs appeal from the Fifth District Court's order dismissing the suit.
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, transferred from
the Utah Supreme Court. Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)G) (West Supp.
2014).
ISSUE PRESENTED

Did the trial court correctly dismiss Plaintiffs' suit to review a State
Engineer's administrative order for lack of standing because Plaintiffs did not
participate in the related administrative proceeding?

2

Standard of Review: Whether the trial court properly granted a motion
to dismiss is a question of law, which appellate courts review for correctness.

Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, ,r 2, 20 P.3d 895.
Preservation: R. 50, 54-57, 307-11.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Determinative to this Court's review is Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14 (West
Supp 2014), which states at Subsection (l)(a):
(1) (a)
A person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may
obtain judicial review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4,
Administrative Procedures Act, and this section.
Also determinative, is Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-401, a subsection of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act. That subsection states in its entirety:
63G-4-401. Judicial review -- Exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency
action, except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited
by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all
administrative remedies available, except that:
(a)
a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust
administrative remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that
exhaustion is not required;
(b)
the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of
the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i)
the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm
disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring
exhaustion.

3

(3) (a)
A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final
agency action within 30 days after the date that the order constituting
the final agency action is issued or is considered to have been issued
under Subsection 63G-4-302(3)(b ).
(b)
The petition shall name the agency and all other
appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet the form
requirements specified in this chapter.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act defines the term "party" at Utah
~

Code Ann.§ 63G-4-103(l)(f) (West 2009):
( 1)

As used in this chapter:

****

(f) "Party" means the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative
proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding officer to
intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule
to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding.

****
The full text of each provision and of the following, other relevant
statutes is set out in Addendum A to this brief:
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-102(1) and (8) (West Supp. 2014)
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402 (West Supp. 2014)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a trial court decision

dismissing Utah Alunite Corporation's (UAC) and the Utah School and
Institutional Trust Lands Administration's (SITLA) suit to judicially review a
State Engineer administrative order. That order, the product of an informal
administrative proceeding, is a final agency action under the Utah
4

Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). Utah Code Ann. §§ 630-4-101 to -

601 (West 2009 & Supp. 2014). Neither UAC nor SITLA participated in the
State Engineer's informal proceeding, R. 4 (,r 17), 14-16, 23-37, 86, and each
lacked standing to bring the trial court suit below. That court correctly granted

~

the State Engineer's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Course of Proceedings. Together, on July 21, 2014, UAC and SITLA
(Plaintiffs), filed a "Petition for Judicial Review," R. 1-3 7, seeking de novo
review of the Central Iron County Water Conservancy District's (CICWCD's)
Application to Appropriate water from the Wah Wah Valley, File No. 69-101
(A76677), (Application). The State Engineer filed his Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction on July 31, 2014 (Motion to Dismiss), R.

50-52, supported by a simultaneously filed Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Dismiss. R. 53-70. CICWCD joined the State Engineer's motion and also
filed its own motion to dismiss on August 6, 2014. R. 78-80.
Plaintiffs opposed each motion in a single memorandum (Opposition
Memo) on August 18, 2014, R. 84-102, to which CICWCD and the State
Engineer replied. R. 264-95; 305-12, respectively. On a Request to Submit, R.

315-17, Judge Lyman issued his "Ruling on State Engineer's Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction" on September 18, 2014. R.

320-30. UAC and SITLA filed a "Notice of Appeal" for the non-final order on

5

~

October 1, 2014, R. 331-33, and an "Amended and Renewed Notice of Appeal"
on October 10, 2014. R. 377-79. After Judge Lyman entered the "Final Order
and Ruling on State Engineer's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
~

Jurisdiction" on October 8, 2014, R. 351-62, (attached hereto as Addendum
B), UAC and SITLA initiated this appeal, which the Utah Supreme Court

transferred to this Court on October 17, 2014. R. 383-86. 1
Statement of Relevant Facts. CICWCD initiated an informal

adjudicative proceeding with the State Engineer on October 17, 2006 when it
filed the Application to appropriate 12,000 acre-feet of water from the Wah
Wah Valley for stockwatering and municipal use. R. 14. The State Engineer
designated the Application on his files as 69-101 (A76677), R. 14, and
published notice to potential protestants on four dates in November 2006, R. 14.

1

This Court may disregard the record documents dealing with the "Partial
Stipulation to Motion to Consolidate" and other documents labeled with Civil
No. 140500022, R. 365-76, 387-405, because they have no bearing on this
appeal. Plaintiffs mistakenly, electronically filed documents at R. 365-69,
370-73, a "Partial Stipulation to Motion to Consolidate" and proposed order in
this case instead of the case for which they were intended, Civil No.
140500022. When Judge Lyman mistakenly entered the proposed order, R.
387-90, Plaintiffs moved to set aside that order, R. 393-96, and Judge Lyman
entered the proposed order, R. 397-98, on October 31, 2014. R. 402-03.
6

The State Engineer received numerous protests, but none from Plaintiffs. 2 R.
14-16.
The State Engineer evaluated the Application under Utah Code Ann. §
73-3-8. R. 18. Consistent therewith, he carefully analyzed the recharge rate of
the valley and other factors that impact the statutory criteria as they relate to the
Application. R. 18-21. The State Engineer held a hearing on the Application
on July 14, 2010. R. 16. After considering the sparsely populated valley's arid
hydrology and available water under the statute, he approved CICWCD's
Application by final agency action- an administrative order issued May 13,
2014. R. 14-23. The order approved the municipal use ofup to 6,525 acre-feet
of water and rejected the stockwatering use for 2000 livestock (about 56 acrefeet per year). R. 21. Neither UAC nor SITLA protested or appeared before the
State Engineer in that administrative proceeding. R. 4 (,r 17), 14-16, 23-37, 86.
The State Engineer's order approving the Application resulted from routine
informal adjudicative proceedings administered under Utah Code Ann. Section
73-3-8. R. 55, n. I; Utah Admin. Code R. 655-6-2 (LexisNexis 2012).
Although neither was a party to that proceeding, on June 2, 2014, UAC and
SITLA filed with the State Engineer a letter purporting to seek agency

2

The State Engineer agrees that UAC was not a going concern in
November 2006, but SITLA was.
7

reconsideration of CICWCD's Application, R. 62-70. That letter also requested
reconsideration ofUAC and SITLA's August 12, 2012 Application to
Appropriate, which is not at issue in this appeal. R. 7 (,r 36), 62-70. 3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Any plaintiff seeking judicial review of informal agency actions must do
·lo@)

so "in accordance with" UAPA and Section 73-3-14. Utah Code Ann.§ 73-314(l)(a) (West Supp. 2014). This statute must be read plainly, giving effect to
all statutory terms. Thus, to invoke statutory jurisdiction under UAPA to bring
suit, id. § 63G-4-402(1)(a) (West Supp. 2014), a prospective plaintiff must be
both a "person aggrieved" and a "party aggrieved." Plaintiffs failed to
participate in the agency action on CICWCD's Application. In light of
applicable statutes and case law, that failure is fatal to their effort to seek
judicial review of the State Engineer's resulting order.
Similarly, because UAPA mandates that its provisions may be

...;)

overwritten only explicitly, id. § 63G-4-102(1)(a) (West Supp. 2014), and
Subsection 73-3-14(1)(a) does not explicitly replace UAPA party status with

3

UAC and SITLA filed their own application to appropriate Wah Wah
Valley water in 2012, six years junior to CICWCD's Application. Although
both appropriation applications were decided in 2014 and gave the junior
appropriators more immediate use of the water, each application was a separate
proceeding. Further, as a matter of established law, because CICWCD's
application was first in time, it was first in right under Utah Code Ann. § 73-321.1 (2)(a) (West Supp. 2014).
8

"person" status, UAP A's narrowly defined "party" requirement restricts judicial
review to only those who participated in an administrative proceeding. Id. §
63G-4-103(f) (West 2009). But even if, arguendo, Subsection 73-3-14(l)(a)'s
"person" status did control UAP A jurisdiction, ample case law specifies that to
qualify as a "person aggrieved" who may seek judicial review of an agency
decision, a person or entity must likewise have participated in the related
administrative proceeding.
Further, because Plaintiffs delayed their involvement with CICWCD's
Application until the State Engineer completed his proceeding, laches and
sound public policy further militate against Plaintiffs interposing themselves at
this late stage to seek judicial review of the State Engineer's decision.

9

ARGUMENT

I.

PLAINTIFFS MAY NOT SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE
STATE ENGINEER'S ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION BECAUSE
NEITHER WAS A PARTY TO CICWCD'S WATER
APPLICATION PROCEEDING.

A.

Only a "party" may seek judicial review.

Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1, et. seq., and the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-101, et. seq. govern actions before
the State Engineer. Pertinent here, Section 73-3-14(1) states, "A person
aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may obtain judicial review in
accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act [UAPA],
~

and this section." Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14(1) (West Supp. 2014). UAPA, in
tum, clarifies that only "[a] party aggrieved," by an informal administrative
proceeding, "may obtain judicial review of final agency action." Utah Code
Ann. § 63G-4-40l(l)(a) (West 2009). Read plainly, see Mallory v. Brigham
Young University, 2014 UT 27, ,r 13, 332 P.3d 922, because the statute says

UAPA and Section 73-3-14 govern judicial review of administrative decisions,
anyone seeking such review of a State Engineer order must be able to satisfy the
rigors of both statutes. Namely, to invoke jurisdiction under UAPA, the party
or person seeking review must have been a party to the State Engineer's related
administrative proceedings. Here, because neither SITLA nor UAC participated

10

as a "party" in the proceedings before the State Engineer, the trial court
correctly ruled that each lacked standing to initiate proceedings in the court
below.
That a plaintiff must be both a "person aggrieved" and a "party
aggrieved" to proceed under UAPA is not remarkable. UAPA is replete with
use of the term "party," clarifying the legislature's intent and policy choice that
only those who participate in agency proceedings - as opposed to those who
wait until proceedings have concluded - may later seek judicial review of an
agency decision. Repeatedly using the term "party," UAPA specifies that, "[a]

party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action[,]" id. §
63G-4-401(1) (West 2009) (emphasis added); that "[a]party may seek judicial
review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available," id. §
63G-4-401(2) (emphasis added); and, that "[a]party shall file a petition for
judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after ... the order ... is
issued[.]" Id. § 63G-4-401(3)(a) (emphasis added). Further, when UAPA spells
out its jurisdictional grant for judicial review, it says "[t]he petition for judicial
review of informal adjudicative proceedings ... shall include: ... (vi) facts
demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain judicial
review[.]" Id. § 63G-4-402(2)(a) (West Supp. 2014) (emphasis added).

11

'"'

UAP A defines a "party" as "the agency or other person commencing an
adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding
officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or
~

agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding." Id. §
63G-4-103(f) (West 2009). Neither UAC nor SITLA fit any of these definitions
and therefore neither may invoke UAPA jurisdiction to seek judicial review of
the administrative action here. 4
Such a plain reading, moreover, is consistent with the Utah Supreme
Court's prior application ofUAPA. In Taylor-West Weber Water Improvement
District v. Olds et al., 2009 UT 86,224 P.3d 709, the Court recognized that

UAPA's party requirements govern judicial review of State Engineer orders.
There, citing directly to UAP A, the Court said "[u ]pon an adverse ruling in an
informal agency adjudication conducted by the state engineer, an aggrieved
party may seek judicial review of the district court[,]" id.

,r 5 (citing Utah Code

Ann.§§ 63G-4-401 to -402 (2008)); also "[u]nder UAPA, only parties that have

4

In addition to Plaintiffs' failure to invoke UAP A jurisdiction, because
they lack "party" status, two related bases prevent Plaintiffs from seeking
judicial review of the State Engineer's order approving CICWCD's Application.
First, because Plaintiffs failed to participate in the administrative proceeding
they have no standing to bring suit; similarly, they have failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies. See Id. § 63G-4-102(1) (West Supp. 2014); id. §
63G-4-401(1) and (2) (West 2009); and id. § 63G-4-402 (West Supp. 2014).
Either additional basis provides independent and sufficient reason to dismiss the
instant case.
12

exhausted their administrative remedies by participating in the agency
adjudication may seek judicial review." Id.

,r 8 (citing to Utah Code Ann.§

63G-4-401(2)). 5 Further, the Court observed, "UAPA governs judicial review
of state agency action .... Once a party has exhausted its administrative
remedies, it may seek district court review of 'final agency actions resulting
from informal adjudicative proceedings."' Taylor West, 2009 UT 86, il 6
(quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-102(1)(b) and -402(1)(a)). Plaintiffs'
attempt, therefore, to parse UAPA, or to circumvent its plain requirements,
should not prevail. But like the plaintiff in Taylor West, by failing to perfect
their interest in the proceedings before the State Engineer, UAC and SITLA had
no right, before the trial court, to initiate judicial review. See Taylor-West,
2009 UT 86, iJ 6; Id. ,I 9 (citing S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087
(Utah 1990) ("[Plaintiff] waived its right to judicial review by failing to
participate in the administrative proceedings.")).

B.

Utah Code Ann. Section 73-3-14 neither preempts UAPA nor
supersedes UAPA's party requirements.

Plaintiffs' contend at Section VI. A. 2. of their brief that "Section
73-3-14(1)(a) controls the right to judicial review of a State Engineer order, not
the general provisions of the UAPA." Pis' Br. 13 (heading capitalization

5

Critical to the Taylor-West Court's reasoning is that a party initiated the

suit.
13

altered). This argument focuses only on the "person aggrieved" language of
that section, Pis' Br. 13-14, to the detriment of the remaining language of
Subsection 14(l)(a), and also the plain language ofUAPA, in accordance with
which Section 73-3-14(l)(a) must be read. Mallory, 2014 UT 27,

~

13 (when

interpreting a statute's meaning, a court should seek to render all parts relevant
and meaningful, "avoiding an interpretation which renders portions of, or words
in, a statute superfluous or inoperative.") (quoting Platts v. Parents Helping

Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997)); also Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, 1
16, 158 P.3d 540 ("[T]he plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole,
and its provisions interpreted in harmony with ... other statutes under ...
related chapters.") (quoting State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ~ 8, 63 P.3d 667
(initial capitalization in original)).
Plaintiffs presented neither contention in the trial court, but argued below
only that Plaintiffs had effectively exhausted their administrative remedies or
v:J

need not exhaust under a UAP A exception. R. 92-99. 6 Because Plaintiffs raise
the arguments for the first time on appeal, they are not preserved and are also
not properly before this Court. See Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68,

6

In fact, the only time Plaintiffs mention Section 73-3-14 in their
Opposition Memo is to quote the "person aggrieved" language just before
launching into their exhaustion argument. R. 92. All other substantive
exhaustion arguments of Plaintiffs' Opposition Memo focus on UAPA.
14

,I,I 14-15, 266 P.3d 828 (Utah's appellate courts do not address new arguments,
claims, issues, or matters for the first time on appeal). As the Court put it, "The
two primary considerations underlying the rule are judicial economy and
fairness." Id. ,I 15. Further, the preservation requirement "prevents a party
from avoiding the issue at trial for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on
appeal if the strategy fails." Id. (quoting Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007
UT 37, ,r 20, 163 P.3d 615) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs proffer the new argument in an apparent attempt to circumvent
the pitfalls and insufficiencies of the arguments they made unsuccessfully
below. Plaintiffs' actions precluded defendants from having the opportunity to
respond to this theory before Judge Lyman. Because Plaintiffs failed to
preserve the issue or to raise this argument in the district court, this Court
should ignore the argument presented for the first time in Section VI. A. 2. of
Plaintiffs' Brief.
Notwithstanding their failure to preserve this argument, Plaintiffs'
contention that Section 73-3-14 alone controls their right of review fails on the
merits. Pertinent here, respecting judicial review, Section 73-3-14(l)(a) states,
in its entirety and with the State Engineer's emphasis: "A person aggrieved by
an order of the state engineer may obtain judicial review in accordance with
[UAPA] and this section." Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14(1)(a) (West Supp. 2014).
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The phrase Plaintiffs omit has meaning. It's meaning is plain. Neither
Plaintiffs, the State Engineer, the trial court, nor this Court are free to ignore it.
But the term "in accordance with" means in agreement or in conformity with,
\;ff)

not, as Plaintiffs contend, in derogation of.
Respecting parties, UAP A Section 63G-4-102(1) states:
Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as
otherwise provided by a statute superseding provisions of this
chapter by explicit reference to this chapter, the provisions of this
chapter apply to every agency of the state and govern: (a) state
agency action that determines the legal rights ... of an identifiable
person ... ; and (b) judicial review of the action.
Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-102(1) (West Supp. 2014). This section establishes

.

viJJ

two things: (1) UAPA directly governs district court 'judicial review" of
agency actions; and (2) a statute may supersede a provision of UAPA only by
"explicit reference." Id.
Although it uses the term "person" not "party," Subsection 73-3-14(l)(a)
permits judicial review of an order of the State Engineer when that review is
sought "in accordance with" UAPA. Under UAPA, district courts have
jurisdiction for judicial review of an agency action when a "party" to that action
initiates a suit. Id. §§ 63G-4-102(1), -401(1), -402(1)(a) (West 2009 & Supp.
2014). Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, see Pls' Br. 13-15, Section
73-3-14(1)(a) does not supersede or replace UAPA-conferred jurisdiction, see
Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-103(±) (West 2009), but contemplates action in
16

conformity therewith. This interpretation of Subsection 73-3-14(1)(a) becomes
even more evident based on a plain reading of Section 73-3-14 's remaining
provisions. Unlike Subsection 14(1 ), Subsection 14(7) does explicitly supersede
some UAPA requirements. There, the legislature says:
A person who files a petition for judicial review is not
required to:
(a) nothwithstanding Subsection 63G-4-401(3)(b), name a
respondent that is not required by this section; and
(b) nothwithstanding Subsection 63G-4-402(2)(a)(iv), identify all
parties to the adjudicative proceeding.

Id. § 73-3-14(7) (West Supp. 2014). Plaintiffs read too much into the absence
of similar, explicit language in Section 73-3-14(1)(a). This Court should not do
the same.
Next, admitting that under UAPA the definition of "party" is "more
restrictive" than the definition of "person," Pls' Br. 12, Plaintiffs nevertheless
fail to apply their own rule that "to the extent the statutes conflict, 'the more
specific provision will prevail over the more general provision."' Pis' Br. 14,
(citing Williams v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 754 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988)).
Plaintiffs' dogged reliance on Williams proves too much. In that case the Utah
Supreme Court held that where the more specific Public Utilities Act conflicted
with the Administrative Rulemaking Act, the Public Utilities Act controlled.
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Plaintiffs assert "The UAPA's relation to Section 73-3-14 is no different." Pis'
Br. 15. Plaintiffs err. 7
Unlike the Rulemaking Act, Section 63G-4-102(1) ofUAPA states the
vi;

Act applies to all agency judicial review actions unless superseded by "explicit
reference." Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-102(1) (West Supp. 2014). At least two
Utah appellate opinions recognize both the import of Section 63G-4-102(1) and
supersession only by "explicit reference" to UAPA. See Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah
Dep 't ofTransp., 896 P.2d 632, 634-35 (Utah 1995) (holding that UAPA

governed judicial review of administrative actions where the specific Highway
sections in question did not supersede UAPA by reference); Hidden Valley Coal
Co. v. Utah Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 866 P.2d 564, 567 (Utah App. 1993)

(recognizing that the Utah Coal Mining and Reclamation Act, as it then existed,
specifically superseded UAPA).
Moreover, to read "person aggrieved" to include only a protestant,
...aJ

Plaintiffs overlook that in Section 73-3-14(l)(a) "person" may refer to either an
unsatisfied protestant or to an unhappy applicant. They assert, "If only a 'party'

7

Merriam-Webster defines "accordance" as "agreement, conformity, <in
accordance with a rule>." Merriam-Webster,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accordance (last visited Apr. 9,
2015). If Section 73-3-14(1)(a) and UAPA must be read in agreement, or
conformity, with one another, Section 73-3-14 cannot, as Plaintiffs suggest,
create a conflict with UAP A that must be resolved via rules of statutory
construction. Thus, Williams, which rules on such a conflict, is inapposite.
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can seek judicial review, it makes no sense for the legislature to provide
different requirements for '[a] person who files a petition' and 'a protestant in
the adjudicative proceedings who files a petition.'" Pis' Br. 13. But it is
because applicants before the State Engineer are also parties to his
proceedings, the term "person" can and does encompass unsatisfied applicants
without also being so broad as to include everyone, or anyone. Thus, while
either "person" - a protestant or applicant - may seek judicial review because
each was a party to the agency proceedings, an applicant need not name herself,
because as the party who initially "requested the adjudicative proceeding," the
reference would already be clear. Not so, however, for a protestantconsequently, only a protestant need name the applicant as a respondent in her
petition. See Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14(4) and (4)(a).
C.

Plaintiffs misstate and misinterpret the history of Section
73-3-14.

Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, in Section 73-3-14, "party" refers only
to those who are parties to a court action, not to administrative parties as UAP A
defines them. Id. § 73-3-14(6) and (7). Plaintiffs assert, "The legislature
clearly had the UAPA in mind when it enacted Section 73-3-14, as the provision
allows a 'person aggrieved' by an order of the State Engineer to obtain judicial
review in accordance with Chapter 4 of the UAPA." Plaintiffs' Br. 13-14. But
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Section 73-3-14's history belies this conclusion. The "person aggrieved"
language first appeared in 1937, Act of Mar. 11, 1937, ch. 130, § 1, 1937 Utah
Laws 237,239, while UAPA appeared in 1987, Utah Administrative Procedures
Act, ch. 161, §§ 257-77, 1987 Utah Laws 830, 954-63, at which time Section
73-3-14(l)(a) was altered to read, in its entirety, "[a]ny person aggrieved by an
order of the state engineer may obtain judicial review by following the
procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63 [UAPA]." Id. § 295, at
971.
Plaintiffs' interpretation of Section 73-3-14 "person aggrieved" as postdating UAPA is mistaken. Most or all of Title 73 evolved from statutes that
long predate UAPA and UAPA terminology. Compare Act of Mar. 13, 1919,
ch. 67, § 54, 1919 Utah Laws 177, 193 ("[T]he individual, corporation or
association affected by such [State Engineer] decision[] shall have sixty days to
appeal therefrom to the district court ...."), and Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14
(1980) ("[A]ny person aggrieved by such [State Engineer] decision may within
sixty days ... bring a civil action in the district court for a plenary review
.-.E)

thereof'), with Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14(1)(a) (West Supp. 2014) ("A person
aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may obtain judicial review in
accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, ... [UAPA] and this section.").

20

This statutory history also illustrates the shift from Section 73-3-14
granting jurisdiction for judicial review of State Engineer decisions to UAPA,
by reference, establishing and governing such jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 63G-4-102(1) (Declaring that Chapter 4, UAP A, governs the judicial review
of all agency actions unless specifically excepted); Id. § 63G-4-401 (1) (West
2009) ("A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review .... "); and Id. §
63G-4-402(1)(a) (West Supp. 2014) ("The district courts have jurisdiction to
review by trial de nova all final agency actions resulting from informal
adjudicative proceedings [except for those relating to juveniles.]").
But even without the support of historical analysis, Section
73-3-14(1)(a)'s use of the term "person," does not supersede UAPA's advised
use of the term "party" throughout the applicable subsections that govern
judicial review of agency actions. Plaintiffs mistakenly assert that: ( 1) "[t]he
legislature clearly had the UAP A in mind when it enacted Section 73-3-14[,]"
Pis' Br. 13-14; (2) Section 73-3-14 is more specific than and hence controls
over UAPA, Pls' Br. 15; and (3) Section 73-3-14's "plain language" allows any
"person aggrieved" to seek judicial review, Pls' Br. 12. None of these
erroneous arguments can substitute for an "explicit reference" in Section
73-3-14 indicating that the term "person" as used in that section supercedes the
term "party" as used in UAP A. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-102(1) ("[E]xcept
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as otherwise provided by a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by
explicit reference[,] ... the provisions of this chapter ... govern ... state
agency action ... and ... judicial review of the action."). No such explicit
vJ

reference exists. Indeed, Section 73-3-14 says precisely the opposite.
II.

EVEN IF, ARGUENDO, UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 73-3-14
CONTROLS JURISDICTION, SECTION 73-3-14 ALSO
REQUIRES THAT A PERSON PARTICIPATE IN THE STATE
ENGINEER'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS BEFORE SEEKING
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE AGENCY DECISION.
As the trial court below correctly determined, neither UAC nor SITLA

may invoke the district court's jurisdiction to hear their suit because neither
meet the UAPA definition of"party." R. 356-58. But assuming, arguendo,
Section 73-3-14 may be read independently from - not in accordance withUAPA, as Plaintiffs suggest, based on a reading of a predecessor statute and
cases interpreting it, Plaintiffs' arguments still fail. 8
Before Section 73-3-14 read "[a] person aggrieved," it read "any person
~

aggrieved." See Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14 (1980); Act of Mar. 5, 2008, ch.
165, § 1, 2008 Utah Laws 1250, 1250. And converse to Plaintiffs' suggestion
under the present statute, every case construing the applicable, prior language

8

Curiously, here, just as Plaintiffs urge this Court to read section
73-3-14(l)(a) independently from UAPA, Plaintiffs themselves attempt to
define the term "person" as used in Subsection 14(l)(a) as it were the same term
as used in UAPA. See Pl's Br. 12.
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assumed or required a plaintiff's prior participation in administrative
proceedings before that plaintiff could seek judicial review. See Wash. Cnty.

Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ,r,r 4, 11-12, 82 P.3d 1125
(construing post-UAPA version of Section 73-3-14); S & G, Inc. v. Morgan,
797 P.2d 1085, 1087-1088 (Utah 1990) (construing pre-UAPA version of
Section 73-3-14); and Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 497-99 (Utah 1989)
(construing pre-UAPA version of Section 73-3-14).
To this end, S & G is instructive. There, the Court likewise construed the
pre-UAPA statute granting court jurisdiction over "any person aggrieved" to
require that person's participation first in the related agency proceedings. 797
P.2d 1085, 1086-87 n.1 (Utah 1990). In that case, plaintiff S & G sold water
rights to the Intermountain Power Agency (IPA). IPA, in tum, filed an
application with the State Engineer to change S & G's use of water, stipulating
in its contract with S & G that IPA's payment would be according to the amount
of water the State Engineer approved for change. S & G took no part in the
State Engineer's administrative action. Id. at 1086. Later, however, when the
State Engineer approved an amount of water less than S & G claimed it used, S
& G sought judicial review, making an argument remarkably similar to UAC
and SITLA's arguments here:
S & G contends that prior to the 1987 amendment
[incorporating UAPA], section 73-3-14 did "not impose a
23

requirement of prior participation in the administrative process."
The statute authorizes judicial review for "any person aggrieved by
[the state engineer's] decision."
Id. at 1087.

As this Court should do here, the Supreme Court declined to read the
Section 73-3-14 's "any person aggrieved" language so broadly. Id. at 1087-88.
"A person aggrieved[,]" the Court said, imposed a "requirement of participation
in the administrative process." Id. at 1087. The present version of Section
73-13-14(1)(a) requires nothing less.
Next, in Bonham, the Supreme Court sustained the judicial review by a
plaintiff non-water user who protested a neighbor's change application claiming
the change would flood his property. Id. 788 P.2d at 497-98. Citing the
version of Section 73-3-14 then in place, the Court emphasized that because
public welfare was part of the change application analysis, the language "any
person aggrieved" in that pre-UAPA statute, id. at 498, included Bonham's
injury, allowing him to seek judicial review because he was an aggrieved
protestant, if not a water user. See id. at 498-99. In short, the Utah Supreme
~

Court recognized a protestant who participated in the administrative action as a
"person aggrieved."
Finally, in Washington County Water Conservancy District, a postUAPA case decided under the prior Section 73-3-14, rather than rely on
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UAPA's definition of"person," the Washington County Court contrasted the
more narrow "any person aggrieved" phrase of Section 73-3-14 with the
broader "[ a]ny person interested" phrase which defines who may file an
administrative protest under Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-7(1) (1989). The Utah
Supreme Court found that although anyone interested may protest an
application to the State Engineer, not all protestants may seek judicial review of
the resulting order:
Were we to interpret the phrase "any person aggrieved" to include
all interested persons who protest a change application, the filing
of a change application would expose the underlying water rights
to otherwise unavailable forfeiture challenges, because an
uninjured protestant would be able to insert its foot into an
otherwise closed jurisdictional door.
2003 UT 58, ~ 16 (emphasis added). This language allows "interested" persons
to seek judicial review only if they are also "aggrieved." It assumes, even
without the UAPA strictures, that the plaintiffs must first have participated
before the State Engineer. The Washington County court explained that,
contrary to the conservancy district's argument, only aggrieved protestants may
seek judicial review. Id.~ 13 (citing Bonham, 788 P.2d at 498 ("[T]here was no
question that the protesting plaintiffs could demonstrate particularized injury ..
. ." (emphasis added)).
These pre and post-UAPA decisions interpreting Section 73-3-14 all
assumed or required that only applicants or protestants to an agency proceeding
25

may seek judicial review of an agency action. None reference UAP A "party"
requirements, but all construe "any person aggrieved" to mean only those who
were prior administrative participants - even if the pre-UAPA Section 73-3-14
v;}J

authorized the court's jurisdiction. Thus, arguendo, even if Plaintiffs were
correct that Section 73-3-14 provides a basis for court jurisdiction separate from
UAPA, that section grants no more or different jurisdiction than does UAPA.

III.

PLAINTIFFS MAY NOT NOW SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW
WHERE THEY SLUMBERED ON THEIR RIGHTS
CONCERNING WAH WAH VALLEY WATER.

In addition to the grounds previously mentioned, this Court may affirm
the trial court on any alternative basis evident in the record. See Bailey v.
Bayles, 2002 UT 58, 113, 52 P.3d 1158. When addressing Plaintiffs'
exhaustion arguments the trial court noted the sheer amount of time that
Plaintiffs waited prior to seeking any relief. R. 359. To now allow Plaintiffs to
judicially adjust CICWCD's Application in light of Plaintiffs' concerns works a
disadvantage to the process and a prejudice not only to the parties, but to
judicial economy as well. This Court should reject Plaintiffs' efforts.
Laches is a "delay that works a disadvantage to another." Papanikolas
Bros. Enters. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah
1975). The doctrine of laches, in turn, contains two elements: one party's lack
of diligence and injury to another party as result. See Angelos v. First Interstate

26

Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983). Whether laches appropriately applies is

circumstantial:
The length of time that constitutes a lack of diligence
"depend[s] on the circumstances of each case,' because 'the
propriety of refusing a claim is equally predicated upon the gravity
of the prejudice suffered ... and the length of [the] delay."
Fundamentalist Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter Day Saints v. Lindberg, 20 I 0

UT 51, ,r 28,238 P.3d 1054 (quoting Papanikolas Bros., 535 P.2d at 1260).
Application of the doctrine of laches hinges on "the relative harm caused by the
petitioner's delay, the relative harm to the petitioner, and whether or not the
respondent acted in good faith." Id.
Concerning exhaustion, Plaintiffs argue in part that UAC and SITLA did
not protest in 2006 because the State Engineer delayed the hearing on the
CICWCD's 2006 Application until 2010. Pls' Br. 18 ("That delay [between
notice and hearing] prevented UAC and SITLA from protesting CICWCD's
application in November 2006 .... "). They continue, "[i]t also prevented UAC
and SITLA from participating in the hearing in July 201 O." Pls' Br. 18. But the
State Engineer's delay after 2006 could not have prevented UAC and SITLA
from protesting the Application in 2006 or from participating in the 2010
hearing. These arguments can hardly have been offered in the good faith
Lindberg requires because UAC and SITLA also assert they "did not [protest]

for the simple reason that they had no interest in the Wah Wah Valley's
27

ew

groundwater in either November 2006 or July 2010." Pis' Br. 6-7. If UAC had
no such interest in 2006, how could it be aggrieved by an application with a
2006 priority date? And if SITLA is aggrieved, as a landowner in the valley it
l.4fi)

has had an ongoing interest in the valley's water since long before 2006. See R.
357. Further, UAC and SITLA entered into a three-year exploration agreement
as early as April 2011. R. 6, ,r 27. Thus, as a landowner with inevitable water
needs, SITLA had an interest in the water when the State Engineer published
notice of CICWCD's Application in November 2006. Plaintiffs, particularly
SITLA, sat on their hands when CICWCD applied for the water in 2006, when
the State Engineer held a hearing in 2010, and even when, in 2012, SITLA,
itself, applied for a junior priority water right in Wah Wah Valley. Plaintiffs'
junior priority water application and whatever opportunities it provides cannot
substitute for Plaintiffs' protesting the CICWCD Application. Thus, the
doctrine of laches bars Plaintiffs' suit.

..i;

IV.

PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION.
Under Plaintiffs' erroneous reading of UAP A and Section 73-3-14, they

first assert they are "aggrieved" persons under Section 73-3-14; then they claim
that "Section 73-3-14(1)(a) grants a 'person aggrieved' a right to judicial review
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in accordance with the UAPA." Pls' Br. 16. 9 Citing to, but ignoring, UAPA's
plain language, they further claim that as a "person aggrieved," they have the
right to exhaust because "Section 63G-4-401 (2) provides that ' [a] party may
seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies
available."' Pis' Br. 16-17. This also, of course, skips over Section
63G-4-401(1) (West 2009), specifying that "[a]party aggrieved may obtain
judicial review of final agency action." (Emphasis added); see also Taylor-West,
2009 UT 86, 11 8 ("Under UAPA, only parties ... may seek judicial review ...
.") (citing Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401(2)). In short, by picking and choosing
the parts of UAPA they want to apply, Plaintiffs arguments would lead to suits
for judicial review of agency actions being initiated by anyone who claims harm
from a State Engineer decision, whether or not she participated in the related
administrative process. That would tum upside-down not only UAPA's specific
requirements, but basic principles of administrative law as well.

9

Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' claims that they are aggrieved, which the
trial court did not decide and are therefore not established facts, the issue before
the Court is not whether UAC or SITLA are "aggrieved" under Washington
County Water Conservancy Dist., 2003 UT 58, ,I,I 16-17 (construing
"aggrieved" as part of the "any person aggrieved" language in Section 73-3-14).
Rather, this case turns on whether Plaintiffs, who did not participate in the
agency deliberations on an application, may seek that application's judicial
review under Section 73-3-14 and UAPA.
29

This Court should not circumnavigate UAP A's straightf01ward
jurisdictional grant to parties by holding that Section 73-3-14(1) broadens the
UAPA exhaustion limitations to include persons who claim to be aggrieved by a
viJ

State Engineer order. Pls' Br. 10 ("UAC and SITLA have standing to seek
judicial review so long as they exhausted available administrative remedies").
To allow strangers to an agency action to seek judicial review goes against the
sound policy of encouraging administrative participation. Plaintiffs should not
be allowed to sit back, wait to see an agency's order, and then assert that
exhaustion requirements have either been met or that it would now be futile to
attempt to meet them. 10
The State Engineer had no duty to ensure the Plaintiffs participated in the
administrative proceeding. And the State Engineer's delay in issuing an order
did not prevent, or in any way influence, SITLA' s administrative participation.
The fact that UAC did not exist when the State Engineer initiated his

viJ

administrative process simply means that UAC by itself may not seek judicial
review of the resulting decision. An entity that could not have exhausted its
administrative remedies with respect to an administrative proceeding by

10

Of course, individuals who own water rights impaired by a State
Engineer order may seek redress through a private action for that impairment
whether or not they participated in the administrative proceeding that produced
the order.
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participating in that proceeding simply may not initiate judicial review of the
resulting administrative decision. But, under Taylor-West it may participate in
such review if a party who meets all Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and UAP A
requirements initiates the review. 2009 UT 86, ,r 9 ("[F]ailure to participate at
the administrative level ... does not affect that party's right under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 24 to intervene in a de novo judicial review proceeding
initiated by another party ....") (citing S & G, 797 P.2d at 1087); See also Utah
Code Ann.§ 63G-4-402(2)(b) (West Supp. 2014) ("[A]dditional pleadings and
proceedings in the district court are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure .... "). SITLA did exist at the time the District filed its Application
and could have participated in the State Engineer's administrative process had it
chosen to do so.
Further, established law and policy mean Plaintiffs are not entitled to
judicial review. Plaintiffs assert that they and CICWCD have "competing
applications." Pis' Br. 19. But UAC's 2012 application does not "compete"
with CICWCD's 2006 Application because Subsection 73-3-21.1(2)(a) of the
Utah Code provides "Appropriators shall have priority among themselves
according to the dates of their respective appropriations, so that each
appropriator is entitled to receive the appropriator's whole supply before any
subsequent appropriator has any right." And, except for certain circumstances
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that don't apply here, "the priority of an application is determined by the day on
which the state engineer's office receives the written application." Utah Code
Ann.§ 73-3-18(4) (West Supp. 2014). 11
Sound public policy requires protestants to bring their issues to the
attention of the State Engineer. Bringing suit without participating in an agency
proceeding ignores this policy. As the Utah Supreme Court said in S & G, Inc.,
"persons aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies 'may not, by
refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such agencies, by-pass them,
and call upon the courts to determine ... matters properly determinable
originally by such agencies."' 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990) (alteration in
original) (quoting People v. Keith Ry. Equip. Co., 161 P.2d 244,249 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1945). The Court should not allow Plaintiffs to do so here.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the State Engineer respectfully requests the
-..J

Court to affirm the district court's proper dismissal of Plaintiffs' action for lack
of jurisdiction.

11

These inapplicable circumstances include applications that lapse or are
otherwise reduced in priority under Utah Code Ann.§§ 73-3-5.6, 73-3-12, 73-320, or 73-3-18(2) {West Supp. 2014). Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-18(4) (West
Supp. 2014).
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Because the procedural posture of this case includes the State Engineer as
a statutory defendant at the trial below, and because oral argument would help
the Court understand the questions of fact and law particular to water at issue in
this matter, Defendant State Engineer encourages the Court to hold oral
argument for this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of April, 2015.

Sean D. Reyes, No. 7969
Utah Attorney General
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Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14(l)(a) (West Supp. 2014)
Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-401 (West 2009)
Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-102(1) and (8) (West Supp. 2014)
Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-103(t) (West 2009)
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402 (West Supp. 2014)

Addendum B -

Final Order and Ruling on State Engineer's Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Civil No.
140500015, Judge Paul D. Lyman.
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ADDENDUMA

Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14(1)(a) (West Supp. 2014):

73-3-14. Judicial review of state engineer order.
(1) (a) A person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may obtain judicial
review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act,
and this section.

Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-401 (West 2009):

63G-4-401. Judicial review-- Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(I) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in
actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative
remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if
this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to
exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm
disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is
issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 63G-4-302(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as
respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this chapter.

Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-102(1) and (8) (West Supp. 2014):

63G-4 ... t02. Scope and applicability of chapter.
(I) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as otherwise provided by a
statute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this chapter,
the provisions of this chapter apply to every agency of the state and govern:
(a) state agency action that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges,
immunities, or other legal interests of an identifiable person, including agency
action to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an
authority, right, or license; and
(b) judicial review of the action.
****

(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to provide an independent basis for
jurisdiction to review final agency action.

****
Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-103(l)(f) (West 2009):

63G-4-103. Definitions.
(1) As used in this chapter:
****
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person connnencing an adjudicative
proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding officer to
intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to
participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding.

****
Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-402 (West Supp 2014):

63G-4-402. Judicial review -- Informal adjudicative proceedings.
(l)(a) The district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final
agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the
juvenile courts have jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating to:
(i) the removal or placement of children in state custody;
(ii) the support of children under Subsection (l)(a)(i) as detennined
administratively under Section 78A-6-1106; and
(iii) substantiated findings of abuse or neglect made by the Division of
Child and Family Services, after an evidentiary hearing.
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as
provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of such a venue
provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or maintains the petitioner's
principal place of business.
(2)(a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall
be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall include:
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial review;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency;
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed, together
with a copy, summary, or brief description of the agency action;
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action;
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceeding;

(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is entitled
to obtain judicial review;
(vii)
a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief
requested;· and
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief.
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(3)(a) The court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law and
any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings.
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this
section.
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAHALUNITE CORP. and the UTAH
SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST
LANDS ADMINISTRATION,
Plaintiffs,

FINAL ORDER AND RULING ON
STATE ENGINEER'S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION

vs.
KENT L. JONES, in his official capacity as
the State Engineer, and CENTAL IRON
COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT,

Civil No. 140500015
Judge Paul D. Lyman

Defendants.

The Respondent, Kent L. Jones, Utah State Engineer (hereafter "State Engineer",
has filed the State Engineer's Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction,
with an accompanying memorandum. The Petitioners, Utah Alunite Corp. (hereafter

"UAC") and Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (hereafter
"SITLA") have jointly filed an opposing memorandum. The State Engineer has filed a
reply memorandum. The State Engineer has filed a Request to Submit. No party has
filed a request for oral argument. 1

FACTS
For purposes of this Rule 12(b)(l) motion the factual allegations of the Petitioners'
Petition for Judicial Review are accepted as true. Hurst v. Highway Department, 397
P.2d 71 (Utah 1964). The following facts, accepted as true, are cited as being relevant to
this Ruling.
1.

Petitioners Utah Alunite Corp. and the Utah School and Institutional Trust
Lands Administration have petitioned for judicial review of the Order for
Application to Appropriate Water No. 69-101(A76677), issued by
Respondent Kent L. Jones, the State Engineer for the State of Utah on May

13, 2014.
2.

Petitioner Utah Alunite Corp. is a Delaware corporation registered to do
business in Utah and is in good standing.

3.

Petitioner Utah School and Institutional Trust lands Administration is an
agency of the State of Utah.

4.

Respondent Kent L. Jones is the State Engineer for the State of Utah,

1 The Court entered its Ruling on State Engineer's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction on September 18, 2014. This Final Order reiterates, with a few minor
typographical and punctuation corrections, the Court's ruling.

Division of Water Rights .
.'-id

5.

Respondent Central Iron County Water Conservancy District (hereafter
"CICWCD") is a water conservancy district serving certain municipalities
and unincorporated areas in and around Iron County, Utah.

~

6.

The District Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3-14 (l)(a) and§ 630-4-402 (l)(a).

vi)

7.

Venue lies in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14 (l)(b) and§
63 G-4-402 (1 )(b) because the water source at issue or a portion of the water
source is located in Beaver County, Utah.

vi)

8.

The Wah Wah Valley, Pine Valley, and Hamblin Valley are located in
Beaver County, Utah. Pine Valley is located directly to the west of the

vi;

Wah Wah Valley, and Hamblin Valley is located directly west of Pine
Valley, along the Utah/Nevada border.
9.

On October 17, 2006, CICWCD filed an Application to Appropriate Water

vii)

Number 69-101 (A76677) with the State Engineer, to approp~iate 12,000
acre feet (hereafter "af') of water annually from groundwater in the Wah
vii

Wah Valley for municipal uses, along with applications to appropriate
water in the two other neighboring valleys.

~

10.

Beaver County was a protestant of CICWCD's application for an
appropriation of groundwater from the Wah Wah Valley, along with the
Bureau of Land Management and hundreds of other protestants.

~

q·
0-

11.

Petitioners were not protestants to these applications.

12.

In July 2010, the State Engineer conducted hearings on CICWCD's

~

applications in the Wah Wah and Pine Valleys. To date, no hearings has
been held on CICWCD's application in Hamblin Valley.
13.

~

In April 2011, UAC entered into a three-year exploration agreement with
SITLA for a mining development to be located on SITLA-owned lands
within the Wah Wah Valley (known as the "Blawn Mountain Project").

14.

On August 21, 2012, Petitioners filed an Application to Appropriate Water
Number 69-115 (A79462) to appropriate 6,500 af of water annually from
the groundwater in the Wah Wah Valley for the Blawn Mountain Project.

15.

The State Engineer heard petitioner's application Number 69-115 (A79462)
in November 2013.

17.

In March 2014, SITLA granted UAC a long-term mining lease to develop
and operate the Blawn Mountain Project.

18.

On May 13, 2014, the State Engineer issued Order for Application to
Appropriate Water No. 69-101 (A76677) in the name ofCICWCD. By the
order, the State Engineer approved CICWCD' s appropriation of 6,525 af of
water annually from the Wah Wah Valley for municipal use.

19.

"

CICWCD was a protestant to Petitioners' application. Beaver County
expressed support for the application.

16.

~

On May 14, 2014, the State Engineer issued Order for Application to

~

Appropriate Water No. 69-115 (A79462) in the names of Petitioners. By
the order, the State Engineer approved Petitioners' application of 6,500 af
of water form the Wah Wah Valley for a fixed 20-year period, subject to
CICWCD's senior water right of 6,525 af annually.
20.

On June 2, 2014, Beaver County and Petitioners filed separate requests for
reconsideration of the CICWCD Order. The State Engineer denied both
requests.

21.

On June 19, 2014, the State Engineer issued an Amended Order for
Application to Appropriate Water no. 69-115 (A79462) in the names of
Petitioners. By this order, the State Engineer approved Petitioners'
application for 6,500 af of water annually from Wah Wah Valley for a fixed
30-year period, which was a 10 year period increase, subject to CICWCD's
senior water right of 6,525 af annually.

RULING
Are UAC and SITLA '~varties'' entitled to judicial review?
The Petitioners asse1t the right to bring this action pursuant to Section 73-3-14 (1)
(a), Utah Code, wherein "A person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may
obtain judicial review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative
Procedures Act, ... "
Section 63G-4-402, Utah Code, details the law regarding judicial review of
informal adjudicative proceedings. The complained of Order for Application to
Appropriate Water No. 14-118 (A76676), the CICWCD Order is the product of an
informal adjudicative proceeding. Section 63 G-4-402 (2)(a)(i) requires the name "of the

party seeking judicial review." Sections 63G 4-4-2 (2)(a)(iv) and (vi) likewise refer to
"parties'' and ''party" involved in the informal adjudicative proceeding.
Similarly, Sections 63G-4-401, Utah Code Annotated limits judicial review
actions to a ''party". (Note: all three subsections specifically reference a 'party" having
certain rights.) Subsection 63G-4-103(l)(f) states the definition of the term "party'' as
follows:

''Party" means the agency or other person commencing an
adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the
presiding officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized
by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative
proceeding.
The Utah Rules of Administrative Code also restrict judicial review to "any party
aggrieved." Rule 655-6-18.A. Rule 655-6-3.F defines the term ''party" with slight

.;

...

variations as follows;

"Party" means the Division (of Water Rights) or other person
commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all protestants, all
persons pennitted by the Presiding Officer to intervene in the proceeding,
and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties
in an adjudicative proceeding.
The problem UAC and SITLA have is that they simply do not fit under either
definition of a ''party". They are not protestants, but SITLA could have been a
protestant. UAC argues that it did not exist on October 17, 2006, when the subject
application was filed. That is right, but its co-petitioner SITLA did exist and surely had
land that would be impacted by the application. SITLA could have easily filed a protest,
which would have enabled it to be a "party," SITLA would then be authorized to proceed
in this action.
UAC still did not exist in July 2010, when the hearings on the CICWCD
application were held. SITLA did exist and could have belatedly sought to protest in that
proceeding, ifit had so desired. In addition, UAC did exist as of August 21, 2012, when
if filed its own application with SITLA, based upon land SITLA owned. As the lessor
and leasee UAC and SITLA could have belatedly together sought to protest in the subject
CICWCD application.
The petitioners did not appear motivated to act until the State Engineer issued his
ruling converting their application to a fixed period, subordinate to the CICWCD

-. i

application.
The fact of the matter is UAC and SITLA do not fit the definition of a party and
they did not seek to protest and as such this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The
motion of the State Engineer should be granted. The petitioners are not entitled to
judicial review of the CICWCD application.
II.

If somehow UAC and SITLA are '<parties"
entitled to judicia] review. have
,.
they exhausted their administrative remedies?

Assuming that the Petitioners can somehow overcome their lack of ''party" status,
they then have to establish that they have exhausted their administrative remedies, before
they can seek judicial review. Section 630-4-401(2). They claim that the State Engineer
considered both the CICWCD application and the Petitioners' application together,
because CICWCD was a protestant of the Petitioners' application and participated in the
November 2013 hearing on the Petitioners' application. Therefore, they have exhausted
their remedies and should be allowed to proceed with this judicial review action.
This case is very similar to the S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990)
case. In S&G the Intermountain Power Agency (hereafter IPA) filed a change
application for some water rights it was purchasing from S&G. Rather than participate in
the change application action, S&G chose to do nothing. IPA proceeded to the required
hearing and the State Engineer took evidence and issued a ruling that S&G did not like.

By contract IPA was to seek judicial review of that ruling but did not. S&G then
belatedly tried to obtain a judicial review. The Court ruled that S&G lacked standing to

appeal because it had waived its right to participate at the appellate level through its
intentional inaction at the administrative level. It had not exhausted its administrative
remedies.
SITLA is an owner of some of the land subject to the CICWCD water application.
For some reason, SITLA did not protest or otherwise become involved in the 2006,
CICWCD application. UAC gets its ability to appropriate water through its lease with
SITLA. Thus, it is stuck with the land owner's actions. The hearing for the CICWCD
claim was in July 2010. SITLA appears to have intentionally not participated in the
CICWCD action before 2010 and it has made no attempt to become involved in it since
.4

2010. SITLA and UAC relied solely on their own application.
As in S&G the intentional choice to not participate in or even attempt to intervene
in another application waives the right to later participate.

A claim that the Petitioners exhausted their administrative remedies in the
CICWCD application by taking action in only their own application, defeats the purpose
of exhausting remedies in the CICWCD application. A party's judicial review right
arises only in applications where the party fully participates.
The Petitioners also argue that as proof of their exhaustion of their remedies, the
court should note the decisions were issued on back to back days, March 13, 2014, and
March 14, 2014. It might also be noteworthy that the Petitioner's water right is made
junior to the CICWCD right. All of this is interesting, but not persuasive. The Supreme
Court in S&G addressed the need for parties to participate at the administrative level as

follows:
A requirement of participation at agency level "ensures that those
who have an interest will bring to the agency's attention all relevant facts
and considerations at the time the agency makes its decision. Moreover,
the requirement of [participation] gives the agency and other participants
notice of the identity and concern of interested parties." (citation omitted)
These observations, although made in the context of a statutory requirement
of party status, are applicable to any administrative decisions in which
interested parties have the right to participate. The requirement of
participation as a prerequisite to standing to appeal is a corollary of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is well settled under
this doctrine that persons aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies
"may not, by refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such
agencies, by-pass them, and call upon the courts to determine ...matters
properly determinable originally by such agencies." (citations omitted)
S&G. Inc. v. Morgan, 797P.2d at 1087.
The administrative remedy of intervention is accomplished by seeking to change
the application from an informal to a formal adjudicative proceeding. Section 630-4-202
(3) allows that to happen at anytime before a final order is issued. Convetting
CICWCD's application to a formal proceeding would have been a way for the Petitioners
to intervene. Section 63G-4-207. Thus, protecting their interest by fully participating in

the CICWCD action. One can only guess at the outcome, but in theory the State
Engineer may well have allowed intervention so as to deal with these competing claims
simultaneously. However, the Petitioners chose not to seek to intervene in the CICWCD
application.

CONCLUSION
The Petitioners are not parties to the CICWCD application. Without being

parties, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioners, even if the non-party
barrier is overcome, chose not to participate in the CICWCD application and to not fully
exhaust their administrative remedies. Consequently the State Engineers Motion to
Dismiss is granted.
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